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The collective rationality hypothesis initiated by Chiappori (1988) and applied by Seaton (1997, 2001) 
for a two-person household is used to distinguish the organizational behaviour of firms. Firms produce 
satisfaction to groups as traditional managerial and early behavioural theories of the firm of
Williamson, Baumol and Marris suggest, as well as more modern principle-agent models. Intra firm 
bargaining leads to a Pareto optimal outcome. What makes this work an important contribution is that it 
identifies a set of non-vacuous testable restrictions to empirically detect if firm level data satisfy Pareto 
optimal behaviour for the main decision makers in the organization. 
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I. Introduction
In this paper the relationship between a two-person/group organisation is introduced 
using traditional game theory models. Secondly, a set of non-vacuous conditions for 
the outcome to be compatible with any bargaining/cooperative solution ((Nash 1950, 
1951), Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975), Rubinstein (1982)), is determined. That data may 
disagree with these restrictions will imply that the firm is internally managed non-
cooperatively or inefficiently relative to the objectives set by the players. The 
methodology is derived directly from the theoretical work of Chiappori (1988a) and 
empirical implementation by Seaton (1997, 2001). This technique has advantages 
over traditional methods of measuring firm level efficiency which implicitly assume 
that firm level agents share an identical objective function.
Emphasis is made in the literature for firm behaviour to be consistent with the 
pursuit of pure profit maximization, see Romer (2006), revenue maximization or cost 
minimization, Varian (1982), when in reality firms may pursue combinations of these 
plus other objectives, agency, personal or even social. Our procedure does not make 
any of these specific assumptions except that the objective function for the firm 
should be concave and increasing (a production function for example, but could also 
represent a utility award to managers/directors or workers, see Varian (1999), p 130)
and that the function can be considered as the outcome of a bargaining procedure. 
This is encouraging as in this sense it allows a wider class of firm level efficiency 
than traditional methods. Another important contribution is that the methodology can 
take into account the transitivity property of players’ preferences, which allows 
analysis of inconsistency with both the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP) 
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and the general axiom of revealed preference (GARP), which is traditionally thought 
of as a highly intractable problem for most data sets, Varian (2006), Famulari (1995).
In what follows our analysis will first identify the revealed preference problem 
of aggregation that lies at the heart of the issue (see Varian (1983) p. 107 and Varian 
(1984) pp 589-590). A general discussion provides a link, see Chiappori (1988b), 
between this approach and game theory solutions put forward by Nash and others. We 
later formalise the model and distinguish the restrictions that data must obey in order 
for consistency with Pareto efficient behaviour. The paper is concluded with examples 
taken from firm level data in order to illustrate the ease of use of such a procedure.
II. Modelling Intra-firm Resource Allocation
Firm level objectives
What are the objectives of the firm? Does the firm act as a unit aiming for maximal 
profits with known costs and production function? Do managers/directors pursue their 
own goals given some pressure from shareholders and employees? This topic has not 
only concerned the pure economics, organisational behaviour and the managerial 
economics literature but is also a solid topic for debate in undergraduate economics 
principles. Recently Romer’s (2006) finds that in the National Football League there 
is a departure from behaviour that would maximize the chance of winning and thus 
suggests other factors must be creeping in to objective functions such as complexity 
(agency issues) or information (use of experience rather than objective analysis).
In reality the firm like the household is an organisation made up of decision 
makers, internal and external (shareholders), who all benefit from the functioning of 
the organisation but do not necessarily possess common objectives, the now familiar 
principle-agent model, Antle and Fellingham (1990), Fama (1980), Magee (1988)) 
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3
makes this a key issue. Following the collective household labour supply literature1
the objectives of the aggregate organisation are assumed dependent on the key 
decision makers. They are defined to hold objectives on firm level inputs Z=(zA, zB, 
zC), but we do not specify the individual objectives explicitly, neither do we need to 
specify who the individuals or groups are, though in many cases this should be 
obvious from the nature of an investigation, in partnerships for example. Indeed the 
only restriction is that the individuals’ (i=A,B) objective functions Yi(zA, zB, zC), are 
concave and increasing in zA, zB, zC.
Difference of opinion between players is inherent in this organisation and the 
model does not moralise on the crude efficiency of the inputs to a specific measurable 
output, as it is often very hard to correctly distinguish the output from the firm i.e. as 
quality of product, gains in social welfare of the community. It is, however, necessary 
for us to address the form of player interaction in a very general manner. This does 
not imply a schizophrenic production function, but rather the complex interplay of 
groups or individuals’ objectives on the final aims of the firm. In essence a welfare 
function is discussed which is additively separable for each player’s objectives. 
Disaggregated models of intra-firm choice and rationality
To set the scene three forms of behaviour for an organization R, are reviewed, 
differentiated by the form of their decision-making process and control over funding 
by two individuals or groups A and B. The first scenario introduces basic ideas of 
revealed preference whilst the second indicates the problem of aggregation. Our third 
1
 See for example Leuthold (1968), Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), Lundberg (1988), Bourguinon and
Chiappori (1992), Famulari (1995), Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Vermeulen (2002).
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and final case examines two-player behaviour for the organisation and highlights the 
problem of organisational efficiency given individual/group objectives.
Common funding, common objectives
The central concept of revealed preference is fairly straightforward (see Varian (1999, 
2006)). Consider figure 1, a firm, A, with only two inputs z1 and z2, makes a choice of 
input mix A1, from the set of input mixes, on or below the current expenditure 
constraint E1, like bundle A3. Now consider a change in input prices, z1 becomes more 
expensive and z2 cheaper. Faced by a new a new expenditure constraint E2 the firm 
chooses A2, which appears to be an entirely rational choice. However if A had chosen 
bundle A3 rather than A2 then it would not be a consistent choice as the firm had 
already revealed a preference for A1 over A3.
Individual funding, individual objectives
Let us expand the discussion to two managers i=A, B, now in different branches who 
are allowed by the organisation (R) to control their branch resources.
In figure 1 E1 represents the initial expenditure possibilities for each of the two 
agents. Players A and B choose affordable input bundles at points A1 and B1
respectively. The sum of these two inputs is represented on the total expenditure 
constraint TE1 at point R1. Given the price change we saw in the previous case for 
player A, the new choices of input mix for A and B on the constraint E2, are A2 and B2
which total to R2 on the new total expenditure constraint, TE2, facing the organisation. 
Player A’s choices are consistent as before and likewise for player B. However, 
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5
looking at the overall organisational choices, these look completely irrational as R1
was initially chosen in preference to R2 when both were available, but upon price 
change, R2 was chosen in preference to R1 again when both were available. Thus a 
Neoclassical single objective function analysis of R would suggest inconsistency with 
rational behaviour. Given the objectives of the individuals in the firms, they have 
made entirely consistent decisions based on their different preferences, clearly a wider 
set of possibilities should be allowed for the firm for aggregation of differing 
individual or group choices.
[Figure 1 about here]
Common funding, individual objectives.
Our analysis now moves on to show that even with a common pool of expenditure the 
bargaining solution yields a wider variation of b haviour than that based on a 
Neoclassical common objective function. 
[Figure 2 about here]
Quadrant (I) of figure 2 is a familiar derivation of the Cournot game solution 
(C). The figure plots the dictatorship or bliss points, (DA, DB) for players A and B
respectively where one player has controlling choice of resource allocation of three 
inputs rA, rB, rC. Note only two inputs need be plotted (rA, rB) as the third is 
determined by the level of finance and the expenditure on the other two inputs. The 
isoquants representing the decreasing levels of Y created for each individual, fan 
outwards from these bliss points, for A, YA1, YA2, YAC, YA3, and for B, YB1, YB2, YBC, 
YB3. Reaction functions are drawn where the isoquant of one player is tangential to 
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choices made for z by the other. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where the two 
reaction curves cross. The level of Y for the Cournot outcome is inferior to the 
bargaining outcome, which might occur anywhere along the line ab, where player 
isoquants are tangential to each other, indicating that joint production of Y is 
maximized in the Pareto sense.
We can derive a similar diagram but measured in terms of the output vectors 
YA, YB  rather than inputs zA, zB  . The transformation is performed through curves in 
quadrants (II) and (III) for A and B respectively. In quadrant (II) the level of Y is 
determined from the contract curve and plotted against zA input. By definition the 
highest value of Y possible is YAD at point DA compared to the low value for player A
when point DB, player B’s bliss point, is reached from input pair zADB, zBDB. Player A
would have to input zAC of z along the contract curve, at point b, to generate the same 
level of output YAC at the Cournot equilibrium (as the same isoquant YAD passes 
through both points). The same mapping of z against YAB is given in quadrant (III).
If we map the results from quadrants (II) and (III) to (IV) then another familiar 
diagram is produced. This shows the maximal output for both players as well as the 
Pareto inefficient Cournot-Nash equilibrium, C. Points ab represent the bargaining set 
in the sense that they signify gains to both players from cooperation and hence a 
motivation for optimal behaviour. The Pareto optimal solution to the bargaining 
outcome might come from the Nash’s (1950, 1953) axiomatic approach (see 
Chiappori (1988b)) with an objective function form of YN=(YA-YCA)(YB-YCB), the 
Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) geometrical solution or a version of the Rubinstein (1982) 
non-cooperative bargaining model.
The model lends itself to a useful interpretation of transaction costs. In general 
a collective rationality solution, that is, where the partners bargain, discuss and 
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7
institute a form of sharing contract should emerge from this organisational game. If it 
does then the solution should emerge between a and b on the contract curve (quadrant 
(I))/Pareto frontier (quadrant (IV)) as these points represent Pareto improvements over 
the Cournot solution C. On the other hand they can just do their best given what the 
other player might do, a non-cooperative Nash solution and many possibilities exist 
for the type of Nash equilibrium achieved. This would provide an inefficient solution. 
The choice of cooperation versus non-cooperation is the realm of the prisoners’ 
dilemma solution where individual rationality dominates collective rationality. Non-
cooperative models differ from the bargaining framework in the sense that they are 
sub-optimal in terms of the distribution of resources between partners. Authors have 
increasingly been frustrated by the lack of explanation of why individuals may take up 
non-cooperation (strike behaviour for example, Manzini (1998))), indeed there seems 
no reason why a non-cooperative solution should exist at all given that both players 
lose out. The prisoners’ dilemma provides a partial answer to this question, see 
Ostrom (2000) for a discussion of collective action, whereas the transactions cost 
literature probably gives us a better understanding of it (Seaton (2001)). Individuals 
cannot necessarily police each other due to high information asymmetry/costs and set 
appropriate contracts, that is, high transaction costs to bargaining may lead to a 
breakdown to non-cooperative behaviour.
[Table 1 about here]
It is worth reflecting on the implications of this model. As an example, two 
partners run an organization, R, and must determine the ideal level of each input. If 
they shared a common objective function, for example maximize output given a 
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8
certain level of expenditure, it would not matter how they behaved, with full 
information and common aims they would still reach the same input and output 
decisions, the Neoclassical Pareto optimal firm, see first row of Table 1. The picture 
changes dramatically if the partners hold different preferences over firms’ input levels 
and goals, see Table 1 row two. If one partner decides all, we have a Neoclassical firm 
result, though depending on which partner holds the position input and output choices 
will be different.  If however democracy prevails and some form of bargaining 
arrangement occurs, then again we have a Pareto optimal sharing rule. Finally non-
cooperation of some type would yield Pareto inefficiency. Thus by allowing a simple 
difference of opinion in the firm many potential models of behaviour emerge. In the 
next section we show that revealed preference analysis allows us to test for this.
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III. Revealed Preference Tests of Intra-firm Rationality
Methodology
The following material is based on the revealed preference literature notably the work 
of Samuelson (1938a, 1938b), Houthakker (1950), Koo (1963, 1965, 1971), Dobell 
(1965), Afriat (1967, 1973), Uebe (1972), Diewert (1973), and Varian (1982, 1983, 
1984, 2006), Chiappori (1988a, 1988b) and Seaton (1997, 2001). Our main results are 
displayed in Appendix One which also explains the implementation of the testing 
procedure. For completeness we will define and compare two forms of behaviour, 
Organisational Neoclassical Rationality (ONR) and Organisational Collective 
Rationality (OCR). Our Neoclassical version of the model assumes that the aim of the 
Organisation, R, is the size of Y where the size of Y is determined purely by both 
players choice of business inputs zA and zB,2 the level of other inputs  zC = zCA  + zCB, 
capital, buildings energy inputs etc, which are jointly bought and funded from 
retained earnings or loans F=FA+FB.  The organisation’s optimisation decision is to 
maximize,
YR(zA, zB, zCA, zCB) s.t. F - wAzA - wBzB - zC  0, (1)
where the price of zC is numeraire. Our only restriction on the form of YR is that it be 
concave, differentiable and increasing. Note we have kept the model simple for 
convenience, practicality and simplicity as both quantities and prices are not so easily 
2
 Although hours of work is an obvious candidate, both inputs could also represent the number of a 
particular employee type i.e. director, non-executive director, part-time or full time worker etc. This 
opens up a potential path of research into organizational governance issues.
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10
recovered from standard data. In this form standard consumer revealed preference 
tests can be used to determine the consistency of choices with ONR.
The primary argument of this paper is that there is some disagreement between 
the players A and B on the actual form of Y, this is very likely in the case for 
technological products where each player may hold specialist information, one may 
be the technical expert whilst the other may be the dynamic entrepreneurial driving 
force behind the product, in marketing for example. In this sense neither partner 
initially agrees on the optimal input mix. Thus two alternative forms for YR are 
suggested; Neoclassical or uniform where Y is identical between individuals, YA = YB
=YR, and represents a standard overall objective function for the organisation and the 
individualistic where Y is different between individuals, where i=A,B  and some form 
of bargaining outcome could be achieved. This second case, our main result, is 
analysed later but it is worth stating that it captures altruistic effects, that player A
takes into account the consumption of the other player, and a special case of an 
egoistic objective function is Yi(zi, zCi), i=A,B.
Different model forms can be suggested for these cases depending on the 
assumptions regarding the level of altruism, egoism on the part of the players as well 
as the jointness in benefit of the inputs, see table 2 below. In Chiappori (1988a), the 
favoured forms were (III) versus (IV).  Here the third input zC can be separately 
consumed, whereas in (I) there is no individual consumption. In the case of the 
household this may be a more relevant scenario, however for the firm either (I) versus 
(II) or (V) versus (VI) might be equally plausible. In (I) and (II) A and B consume 
equal quantities of the input, a public input, which seems sensible if satisfaction is 
based upon some output measure. The latter case, where there is joint use of inputs, 
might also be relevant, especially if we talk about two separate plants, which purchase 
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inputs separately (data might be available here in certain well defined studies). 
However, the latter cases (V) versus (VI) may be far too general to provide sufficient 
restrictions on behaviour, so for this analysis we restrict our cases mainly to (I) versus 
(II) and use (III) versus (IV) for comparison to the initial work done by Chiappori 
(1988a) and Seaton (1997, 2001). 
[Table 2 – about here]
To illustrate we use model (III) from the Table 2. For convenience we change notation 
slightly; let
Y = Y(Z), where Z = (zA, zB, zCA, zCB) = (z1, z2, z3, z4)  and  z3 = z4 = 0.5zC, (2)
write an appropriate price vector for all the inputs as 
P = (wA, wB, 1,1) = (p1, p2, p3, p4). (3) 
by analogy to Chiappori/Seaton, though not critical to this paper, we consider this 
model represents directors (z1), employees (z2), where both enjoy some share of the 
input (z3), in terms of their belief in its contribution to output and also in their direct 
use of it, in the case of directors this could be use of company cars, for employees 
staff canteen facilities, alternatively heating and buildings are also good candidates.
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Testing individual rationality (ONR)
Consider a set G(Z) of n input bundles Z1,Z2,Z3,...,Zn  where Zk=(zk1, zk2, zk3, zk4) from 
observed behaviour.  Koo (1971) and Varian (1982) define DR to mean directly 
revealed preferred where
Z1(DR)Z2 if P1Z1  P1Z2. (4)
As DR is a binary relationship, Koo (1971) showed that for a finite group G(Z) of 
input bundles a Boolean matrix could be constructed to yield a summary of the agents 
preference structure over some observed input bundles, see appendices.
Further we can compare data for consistency with the following alternative axioms of 
preference theory.
ONRWARP = { If Zi(DR)Zj then not Zj(DR)Zi for Zi  Zj}
ONRGARP = { If Zi(R)Zj then not PiZi > PiZj for Zi  Zj}
ONRSARP = {If Zi(R)Zj then not Zj(R)Zi for Zi Zj},
(5)
Tests of collective rationality (OCR)
Following Varian (1984, p 590 Theorem 11), Chiappori(1988a) and Seaton(1997, 
2001)  and arguing that some form of bargaining compromise (sharing rule, see 
Chiappori (1988a)) is reached then partners optimise,
YR  = aAYA(zA, zB, zCA, zCB)+ aB YB(zA, zB, zCA, zCB), (6)
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where aA , aB  0 , aA + aB = 1, ai= ai(wA, wB, FA, FB, XA, XB), i=A,B and (XA, XB)
represents characteristics of the players. OCRWARP,OCRGARP and OCRSARP can 
be written in a similar way to their ONR analogues excepting that they must take into 
account now two restrictions, each based upon the personal prices for each group, as 
well as taking into account the jointness, if any, assumed in the inputs, see Appendix 
One for details. It is worth noting that ONR is a special case of OCR when either 
aA = aB = 0.5 or one ai is zero.
IV. Examples and Results
In all four examples below firms were selected where they reported sales, 
depreciation, employment, number of directors, director remuneration, total 
remuneration and operating profit. The measure of total expenditure is total sales 
minus operating profit plus depreciation and the cost of each input is calculated in a 
simplified manner. The cost of a director is simply the average directors’ 
remuneration, whilst employees’ wages are calculated in a similar way.
Example One: Morgan Crucible Plc
Let us consider some data from Morgan Crucible Plc over the years 2000 to 2004, 
presented in Table A1.1 of the Appendix Two. Here we must deflate all prices by an 
appropriate input price index. From our analysis the data from Morgan Crucible are 
entirely consistent with all axioms, ONRWARP, ONRGARP, ONRSARP and 
therefore OCRWARP, OCRGARP and OCRSARP. As this data is consistent with 
that of the Neoclassical organisation (ONR), how do we interpret these results? Either 
the objectives of the organization are so firmly held in stone and agreed by decision 
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makers that bargaining is not a relevant modelling outcome or that a dictatorship point 
like DA in figure 2 exists.
Example Two: Multinational corporations industry wide.
A heterogeneous sample of very large firms were derived in a sample of 92 quoted 
companies from the Datastream (Worldscope) database in different industries with 
sales in the US, Europe and the UK over a period of at least 14 years, sampled in the 
year 2003. There were no restrictions placed on industry, employees etc. Indeed 
heterogeneity was the desired goal. In this sense it is expected that a high degree of 
inconsistency should be found with ONR. In reality the number of inconsistencies 
with ONRWARP and ONRSARP are 36 (less than 1%) and 48 (less than 1%) 
respectively, which does not seem particularly high. However, testing for OCR (see 
table 3) also finds inconsistency with the Pure input form, both SARP and WARP. 
This indicates complicating factors emerge in this group of firms, which we discuss 
later. However the data are consistent with the Joint version of all OCR axioms and 
the Pure realisation of OCRGARP. This points to the possibility that individuals are 
unable to have much impact on firm objectives.
Example Three : The computer industry
In total the FAME database holds 2228 companies in the 4-digit SIC category 3002, 
the manufacture computers and other information processing equipment, this includes 
2058 identifiable public and private limited companies of which 22 are public limited.
After selecting on our desired variables a sample of 107 firms remained. We find as 
before that there is inconsistency with ONR. In fact 180 for ONRWARP (just 1%) 
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and 1044 for ONRSARP (5%) which is a great deal higher than we expected from the 
previous example as these firms derive from the same industry with the same 
accounting years. Just as with Example Two we find inconsistency with Pure OCR 
but consistency with Joint OCR.
[Table 3 – about here]
Example Four : The computer industry, sub-sampled by size
For a more in depth analysis of the data presented in example three the sample of 107 
companies is split into sub-samples of 30 then 50 firms by size of firm. Thus the first 
sample of 30 firms would consist of the smallest 30 firms. The second sub-sample 
would contain the same firms except the smallest would be replaced by the 31st
smallest. This sampling progresses until the final sub-sample which would contain the 
top 30 largest firms. 
Sub-samples of size 30 and 50 violate all ONR axioms as with examples two 
and three. Interestingly the number of inconsistencies displayed in figures 3 and 5, by 
size of firm in each sub-sample, indicate a rise in inconsistency until a peak for 
medium sized firms, falling off for large firms. This is represented by a U-shaped 
trough for the ‘Goodness of fit’ measure used (see note to Table 3).
[Figure 3 about here]
The tests of inconsistency with OCR (Pure version) were very surprising. 
Here, see figures 4 and 6, small to medium firms appear to have behaved consistently 
with the OCR hypothesis of bargaining behaviour. However, the larger firms did not. 
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On the plus side the data are consistent in all cases with the joint third input model
and the Pure OCRGARP axiom.
[Figure 4 about here]
The results together appear to indicate that intra-firm resource allocation is 
determined by a successful bargaining form between the key decision makers in small 
to medium firms. Increasing further the size of firm tends to bring in complicating 
features that are not assumed in the bargaining model. There are many possible
factors. First, bargaining may be failing to some form of non-cooperation (increasing 
transactions costs i.e. policing and information failure) as discussed in previous 
sections. Second, a much wider s t of individuals/group might be involved in the 
bargaining situation (shareholders, directors, managers, other employees (trade 
unions)).
[Figure 5 about here]
[Figure 6 about here]
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V. Concluding Comments
The aims of this paper were twofold. First to show that the firm could be viewed as an 
organization where decision makers can hold differences of opinion and, secondly, to 
produce a workable test of organisational form. Given this interpretation of the firm,
revealed preference methods for examining the implications of aggregated behaviour 
were presented. Four examples with three different sample types indicate the 
applicability of these methods and provide some explanation of apparent 
inconsistency with traditional Neoclassical techniques (ONR).
The key conclusion from the brief application of this methodology is that 
smaller firms (at least in the computing industry) appear to possess cooperative 
decision making behaviour though larger firms may not. The failure of some data to 
fulfil the restrictions imposed by the OCR model is in some sense absolute, though 
none failed OCRGARP in any examples. The cause of failure may be the existence of
more than two decision making groups, aggregation of inputs and also whether there 
are competitive labour markets, as well as the comparability of firms in each sample. 
The main contribution of this work is that we now have a methodology that 
allows us to filter data for potential governance implications on input demand as 
Seaton (2001) shows for the household organisation. In this sense we can analyse 
whether hierarchy/governance may be failing to allow decision makers to realize their 
goals. Although this paper has been directed at determining inconsistency with the 
underlying model, further work should also be targeted at the implications for 
restrictions on input demand functions as this is a fairly straightforward application of 
Chiappori’s (1988a) contribution.
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Appendix One: Derivations
Organisational Neoclassical Rationality (ONR)
Following the analysis of Koo (1971) where the group G(Z) is restricted to 5 input 
bundles, G(Z) =[Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5] the matrix of expenditure differences (PiZi - PiZj)
are easily calculated, see Table A1.2 in the examples appendix. From these define the 
ijth element of M, an n by n Boolean matrix as
mij =1 if PiZi  PiZj, that is if Zi(DR)Zj. (A1)
The matrix M can be summarized by the use of directed graphs or digraphs. 
That is, for the square (n x n) Boolean matrix M, the digraph, D(M), consists of points 
or vertices  V1,V2,...,Vn and lines or edges ViVj which exist if mij = 1 but not if mij = 0
in M. Our data in M is now shown in the digraph in Figure A1.
 [Figure A1 about here]
Our question is whether this data appear to satisfy consistency of choice as a single 
organisation. Here we introduce a number of key axioms, from Varian (1982), the 
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) is defined in the following way, if Zi is 
directly preferred to Zj then bundle j cannot be preferred to bundle i, or
WARP = { If Zi(DR)Zj then not Zj(DR)Zi for Zi  Zj} (A2)
This relation is also known as an acyclic strict order relation. It is worth looking at a 
violation of WARP in the following example
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0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
M = V4
V3
V1
V2
(A3)
Note the cycle from V1 to V2 and back to V1, the digraph is not Acyclic and is a clear 
violation of WARP. 
The next example possesses a cycle, but is not a violation of WARP. Here we 
need a stronger argument to capture this apparent inconsistency in choice.
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
M = V4
V3
V1
V2
(A4)
For this reason a second axiom called the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference was 
suggested, and defined as,
SARP = {If Zi(R)Zj and Zi Zj implies not Zj(R)Zi }, (A5)
where Revealed preferred (R),  Zi(R)Zj  means for some sequence of observations (Zi , 
Zk, Zl, Zm, Zj).  Zi(R)Zj: If PiZi  PiZk, PkZk  PkZl, PlZl  PlZm, PmZm  PmZj. We say 
here that (R) is the transitive closure of the relation (DR), and can be written as,
Zi(R)Zj: If Zi(DR)Zk, Zk(DR)Zl, Zl(DR)Zm, Zm (DR)Zj. (A6)
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In this sense the data above are inconsistent with SARP because it is not acyclic, the 
cycle exists from V1,V2 to V3 and back to V1.
However, another case with for example Z1(DR)Z2 and Z3(DR)Z1 shows the strength 
of the SARP axiom, consider the Boolean matrix and digraph below, where, again 
WARP is satisfied.
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0M =
V1 V2
V3 (A7)
But if we note that through transitivity Z3(DR)Z1, Z1(DR)Z2 implies that Z3(R)Z2
represented in the new Boolean matrix M* with a star and digraph as the dotted 
arrow.
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1*
0M* =
V1 V2
V3 (A8)
We complete this discussion by looking at a final axiom, which is less restrictive than 
SARP but does take into account transitivity, the Generalized Axiom of Revealed 
Preference can be written as,
GARP = {If Zi(R)Zj implies not Zj(SDR)Zi }, where Strictly Directly Revealed 
Preferred (SDR), is represented by Zi(SDR)Zj: If PiZi > PiZj
Consequently if mij*=1 and PjZj > PjZi  then GARP is violated.
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Organisational Collective Rationality (OCR)
We can rewrite expression Y and perform some convenient relabelling, let players, 
A=1, B=2 and Z = (zA, zB, zCA, zCB) = (z1, z2, z3, z4), thus
Y = a1 Y1(Z) + a2 Y2(Z), (A9)
we can also write an appropriate price vector for all the inputs as 
P = (wA, wB, 1,1) = (p1, p2, p3, p4) (A10)
So pq represents the price of input zq where q=1,2,3,4. Following Chiappori (1988) 
and Seaton (1997) if we observe a mix Zj, j=1,2,…, N  is chosen then 
ZjPj  ZPj
It is revealed preferred to all other affordable Z. The general firm level bargaining 
optimisation problem can be expressed as,
= a1jY1(Z) + a2jY2(Z) +j(ZjPj - ZPj),   j=1,2,…,N. (A11)
Differentiating with respect to individual i's desired input of q we get
 a1
jY1iq + a2jY2iq  = jpqj,   j=1,2,…,N (A12)
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dividing this expression through by j and noting that the new expression simply 
stated uses the additive separability of the individual utility functions to split the value 
of  price to individual level shadow/personal prices, the expression can be rewritten as
 jiq pqj +(1-  jiq)pqj = pqj,   j=1,2,…,N,  and    jiq  0 (A13)
We require for each individual that each set of personal prices, , and 
quantities satisfy individual rationality. So for collective rationality to be true here, 
both individual rationalities must be satisfied given the nature of the choices made and 
values of the shadow prices (  jiq pqj , (1-  jiq)pqj ), though aggregate prices and input 
quantities may not.
OCR Implementation
Tests for the rationality of choices for one individual given prices and bundles chosen 
are straightforward to do using revealed preference techniques. As we typically 
possess data regarding quantities of inputs, then the form of Z is typically known. 
Similarly we also normally possess information as to the value of input prices. 
However we do not know the individual valuation () put on these inputs by the 
bargainers. All we do know are their bounds (p p  0). Further we cannot perceive 
the individual levels of inputs selected by the individuals except of course number of 
employees, (z1, z2).
Page 27 of 87
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
26
For the moment let us proceed as if we do know these values. For each observation 
j,k=1…N  we can construct two Boolean matrices representing the preference choices 
for i=A,B respectively depending on the personal prices they possess. That is
Mjki=1 if ji(Zj-Zk) 0 otherwise Mjki=0 (A14)
where jA =( jA1p1j,  jA2p2j,  jA3p3j,  jA4p4j)= ( jA1wAj,  jAwBj,  jA3,  jA4)=
and jB =((1- jA1)p1j, (1- jA2)p2j, (1- jA3)p3j, (1- jA4)p4j)
= ((1- jA1)wAj, (1- jA2)wBj, (1- jA3), (1- jA4))
and Z=(zA, zB, zCA, zCB) (A15)
as the data on individual quantities of zC may only exist in aggregated form we 
introduce another parameter to indicate that the division is unknown, thus 
z jC=  jA5zCA, + (1- jA5) zCB. (A16)
The final result of our comparison with personal prices is the two Boolean matrices 
MjkA and MjkB where j,k=1…N (A17)
As the parameters  jA1,  jA2,  jA3,  jA4,  jA5, j=1,2,…N are unknown, trial values can 
be inserted to minimize the number of CR inconsistencies. For a few observations (3 
say) this is a trivial exercise, but for large N then 5N parameters must be searched and 
the problem becomes highly intractable. Searching 5 parameters over 7 values for N 
observations gives 75N trials (for 10 observations 7501.798x1042, if each trial took 
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one billionth of a second to calculate it would still take centuries to check each trial). 
So some simplification was needed especially for samples sizes of N=50 or more.
A two stage method was used here to take account of similarities and differences of 
parameters across observations, remember that the Neoclassical model assumes all 
parameters are fixed at 0.5 for all observations, so we are allowing a high degree of 
flexibility in the search.
Stage 1. Capture parameter homogeneity across observations.
A grid search fixing  jA1,  jA2,  jA3,  jA4,  jA5 for all j to A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and 
varying these between 0 and 1 inclusive. For example if we try out values 0, 0.5 and 1
[Table A1 here]
Note there is a symmetry here, trial 1 is equivalent to trial 35. (we need only do half 
the trials).
If +1 values chosen, 0, 1/, 2/,…, /, then ((+1)5 –1)/2 combinations or if =7 
then (16807-1)/2=8403 trials need to be made. However it was seen that for most data 
=2 seemed adequate. We checked that no Boolean matrix collapsed to a null, none 
did. 
Stage 2. To capture observational heterogeneity.
A grid search for each observation at a time   jA1,  jA2,  jA3,  jA4,  jA5, j=1,2,…N  was 
carried out for the same +1 values. For N observations this means N(+1)5
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combinations and a total of (N+1)(+1)5 combinations for both stages. Stage 2 was 
repeated  number of times. Thus (N+1)(+1)5  trials altogether.
The OCRWARP test to determine (for each parameter search) whether for all k and j
that for individuals/groups A,B, is
If MjkA =1 implies not MkjA =1 and jk
and 
If MjkB =1 implies not MkjB =1 and jk (A18)
in which case the data does not conflict with that particular realization of the 
bargaining model for. A failure to find any parameter values that satisfy individual 
rationality for each matrix would imply some deviation from the bargaining model i.e. 
non-cooperative behaviour. Note this is a weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) 
realisation of the problem, SARP and GARP can also be introduced in the form
If M*jkA =1 implies not M*kjA =1 and jk
and If M*jkB =1 implies not M*kjB =1 and jk (A19)
for OCRSARP, and thus for OCRGARP, both
If M*jkA =1 implies not if jA(ZjA-ZkA) >0 =1 and jk
and if M*jkB =1 implies not if jB(ZjB-ZkB) >0 =1 and jk. (A20)
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Appendix Two
Example 1: Morgan Crucible Plc, 2000-2004
[Tables A2 to A4 here]
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Figure 1. The Aggregation Problem for A and B (Adapted from Green (1976), p. 144)
A2 A1
B2
B1
R1
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Figure 2. Comparison of models
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Figure 3. ONR Goodness of fit for Example Four
___ ONRWARP, - - - ONRGARP, -o-o- ONRSARP 'Goodness of fit', 
sub-sample size 30, ordered by size of firm
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Figure 4. OCR Goodness of fit for Example Four, note GARP =1 throughout
OCRWARP the same as OCRSARP 'Goodness of fit' (Pure)
OCRGARP=1 for all cases, 
sub-sample size 30, ordered by size of firm
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Figure 5. ONR Goodness of fit for Example Four, Sub sample size=50
___ ONRWARP, - - - ONRGARP,-o-o- ONRSARP 'Goodness of fit' 
sub-sample size 50, ordered by size of firm
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58
Sample
Go
o
dn
e
ss
 
o
f f
it
Page 36 of 87
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
35
Figure 6. OCR Goodness of fit for Example Four, note GARP =1 throughout, 
subsample size=50.
OCRWARP same as OCRSARP 'Goodness of fit' (Pure), 
sub-sample size 50, ordered by size of firm
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Figure A1. Digraph of Morgan Crucible’s preferences
V5
V2
V3V4
V1
Page 38 of 87
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
37
Table 1. Governance and difference of opinion
Objectives
(preferences)
Governance
and institutional 
relationships
Autocracy
Dictatorship
Democracy
Bargaining
Anarchic 
Non-cooperative
Homogeneous Neoclassical
Pareto Optimal
(One solution, YR)
Neoclassical
Pareto Optimal
(One solution, YR)
Neoclassical
Pareto Optimal
(One solution YR)
Heterogeneous Neoclassical
Pareto Optimal
(Two solutions 
DB, DA)
Pareto Optimal
(Complex, many 
solutions 
depending on 
bargaining power 
or Nash YN )
Pareto Inefficient
(Complex,
many solutions, like 
Cournot C)
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Table 2. Alternative objective functions for decision makers in the firm
Objectives Input type
Pure 
Inputs
One Joint 
Input
zC
All Joint
Inputs
zA, zB, zC
Uniform
(I)
YR(zA, zB, zC)
(III)
YR(zA, zB, zCA, zCB)
(V)
YR(zAA, zAB, zBA, zBB, zCA, zCB)
Individualistic
(II)
YA(zA, zB, zC)
YB(zA, zB, zC)
(IV)
YA(zA, zB, zCA, zCB)
YB(zA, zB, zCA, zCB)
(VI)
YA(zAA, zAB, zBA, zBB, zCA, zCB)
YB(zAA, zAB, zBA, zBB, zCA, zCB)
Individualistic
Egoistic
(II)
YA(zA, zB, zC)
YB(zA, zB, zC)
(IV)
YA(zA, zCA)
YB(zB, zCB)
(VI)
YA(zAA, zBA, zCA)
YB(zAB, zBB, zCB)
Asymmetric
Altruism(A)
Egoism (B)
(II)
YA(zA, zB, zC)
YB(zA, zB, zC)
(IV)
YA(zA, zB, zCA, zCB)
YB(zB, zCB)
(VI)
YA(zAA, zAB, zBA, zBB, zCA, zCB)
YB(zAB, zBB, zCB)
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Table 3. Goodness of fit
Goodness of fit Example
Axiom
Morgan
Crucible
(N=5)
Multinationals
(N=92)
Computing
(N=107)
ONRWARP 1 0.9978 (36) 0.9921 (180)
ONRGARP 1 0.9977 (38) 0.9757 (550)
ONRSARP 1 0.9971 (48) 0.9540 (1044)
OCRWARP (Pure) 1 0.9998 (4) 0.9998 (4)
OCRGARP (Pure) 1 1 1
OCRSARP (Pure) 1 0.9998 (4) 0.9998 (4)
OCRWARP (Joint) 1 1 1
OCRGARP (Joint) 1 1 1
OCRSARP (Joint) 1 1 1
Note: These measures of goodness of fit should not be confused with those encountered in econometrics and 
statistics as they refer to some suggestions in the revealed preference literature. Essentially any inconsistency 
means failure, however authors such as Varian (2006) feel that useful information can be gleaned from 
investigation the inconsistencies further. For a short survey of goodness of fit measures see Varian (2006). We use 
the formula (TPI-TI)/TPI where TPI is the Total Possible Inconsistencies (2(N2-N)) from two unit matrices (both 
groups) and TI is the Total of Inconsistencies found, Famulari (1995), Varian (2006). Thus a value of unity implies 
no inconsistencies, below unity means the data is inconsistent but provides a feel for how bad it is.
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Table A1. Parameter trial values
Trial A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0.5 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0
4 0 0.5 0 0 0
5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
6 1 0.5 0 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
35-2 0 1 1 1 1 
35-1 0.5 1 1 1 1
35 1 1 1 1 1
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Table A2. Morgan Crucible Plc data
year Z Directors
z1
Other 
employees
z2
Expenditure
zCA =z3+z4
Average 
wage dir
p1
Average 
wage 
employees
p2
Input 
price 
index
2004 Z1  8 12779 560184 335.51  24.74   0.9370
2003 Z2  7 14011 594347 621.42  25.22   0.9384
2002 Z3 10 14852 548202 134.34  23.38   0.9818
2001 Z4  9 16084 534555 132.46  23.51   1.0032
2000 Z5  9 16158 581201 146.22  24.44   0.9643
Note: The original accounts data has been processed, by deflating all nominal variables by an 
appropriate monthly input price index averaged over each financial year.
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Table A3. Calculation based on prices and quantities
piZi - piZj 1 2 3 4 5
1 0 -32156.26  -19992.14 -28242.93 -52481.75 
2   32307.69 0 11534.29   3132.07 -21124.42 
3   18381.33 -13037.75  0 -7513.61 -31702.11 
4   26118.21 -5385.39   7598.13 0 -24193.52 
5   51887.00  19818.44  32390.96  24227.86 0
Note: Calculation of expenditure differences.
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Table A4. Boolean Matrix
mij =1 if PiZi - PiZj 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 1 1 0
3 1 0 1 0 0
4 1 0 1 1 0
5 1 1 1 1 1
Note: mij =1 if PiZi - PiZj, that is if Zi(DR)Zj. If the ijth element of table A1.2 is positive record the 
value unity for mij otherwise zero
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A non-parametric revealed preference test 
of optimal intra-firm resource allocation
Jonathan S. Seaton
Business School,
Loughborough University,
Loughborough,
Leicestershire LE11 3TU,
UK
Tel: +44 (0)1509 228838
Email: J.S.Seaton@Lboro.ac.uk
13 June, 2007
The collective rationality hypothesis initiated by Chiappori (1988) and applied by Seaton (1997, 2001) 
for a two-person household is used to distinguish the organizational behaviour of firms. Firms produce 
satisfaction to groups as traditional managerial and early behavioural theories of the firm of
Williamson, Baumol and Marris suggest, as well as more modern principle-agent models. Under 
certain conditions intra firm bargaining leads to a Pareto optimal outcome. What makes this work an 
important contribution is that it identifies a set of non-vacuous testable restrictions to empirically detect 
if firm level data satisfy Pareto optimal behaviour for the main decision makers in the organization. 
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I. Introduction
In this paper the relationship between a two-person/group organisation is introduced 
using traditional game theoretic models. Secondly, a set of non-vacuous conditions for 
the organisational choices to be compatible with any bargaining/cooperative solution 
(Nash (1950, 1951), Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975), Rubinstein (1982)), is determined. 
That data may disagree with these restrictions will imply that the firm is internally 
managed non-cooperatively or inefficiently relative to the objectives set by the 
players. The methodology is derived directly from the theoretical work of Chiappori 
(1988a) and empirical implementation by Seaton (1997, 2001). The technique has 
advantages over popular methods of measuring firm level efficiency which implicitly 
assume that firm level agents share an identical objective function.
Emphasis is made in the literature for firm behaviour to be consistent with the 
pursuit of pure profit maximization, see Romer (2006), revenue maximization or cost 
minimization, Varian (1982), when in reality firms may pursue combinations of these 
plus other objectives, agency, personal or even social. Our procedure does not make 
any of these specific assumptions except that the objective function for the firm 
should be concave and increasing (a production function for example, but could also 
represent a utility award to managers/directors or workers, see Varian (1999), p 130)
and that the function can be considered as the outcome of a bargaining procedure. 
This is encouraging as in this sense it allows a wider class of firm level efficiency 
than alternative methods. Another important contribution is that it can take into 
account the transitivity property of players’ preferences, which allows analysis of 
inconsistency with both the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP) and the 
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2
general axiom of revealed preference (GARP), which is a highly intractable problem 
for most data sets, see Varian (2006) and Famulari (1995).
In the following section the revealed preference problem of aggregation that 
lies at the heart of the issue (see Varian (1983) p. 107 and Varian (1984) pp 589-590) 
will be identified within a general discussion, providing a link, see Chiappori (1988b), 
to game theoretic solutions put forward by Nash and others. The model is formalised 
in Section III and restrictions are derived that data should obey for consistency with 
Pareto efficient behaviour. In Section IV the empirical methodology is presented with 
a number of examples using firm level data. The paper is concluded in Section V.
II. Modelling Intra-firm Resource Allocation
Firm level objectives
What are the objectives of the firm? Does the firm act as a unit aiming for maximal 
profits with known costs and production function? Do managers/directors pursue their 
own goals given some pressure from shareholders and employees? This topic has not 
only concerned the pure economics, organisational behaviour and the managerial 
economics literature but is also a popular topic for undergraduate economics 
principles. As an illustration of this topicality Romer (2006) found that in the National 
Football League there is a departure from behaviour that would maximize the chance 
of winning and thus suggests other factors must be creeping in to objective functions 
such as complexity (agency issues) or information (use of experience rather than 
objective analysis).
In reality the firm like the household is an organisation made up of decision 
makers, internal (workers, managers, directors) and external (shareholders and 
pressure groups), who all benefit from the functioning of the organisation but do not 
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necessarily possess common objectives, the now familiar principle-agent model, Antle 
and Fellingham (1990), Fama (1980), Magee (1988)) makes this distinction. 
Following the collective household labour supply literature1 the objectives of the 
aggregate organisation are assumed dependent on the key decision makers. They are 
defined to hold objectives on firm level inputs Z=(zA, zB, zC), but individual objectives 
are not explicitly specified, neither do we need to identify who the individuals or 
groups are, though in many cases this should be obvious from the nature of an 
investigation, in company partnerships for example. Indeed the only restriction is that 
the individuals’ (i=A,B) objective functions Yi(zA, zB, zC), are concave and increasing 
in zA, zB, zC.
Difference of opinion between players is inherent in this organisation and the 
model does not moralise on the crude efficiency of the inputs to a specific measurable 
output, as it is often very hard to correctly distinguish the output from the firm i.e. as 
quality of product, gains in social welfare of the community. It is, however, necessary 
for us to address the form of player interaction in a very general manner. This does 
not imply a schizophrenic production function, but rather the complex interplay of 
group or individual objectives on the final aims of the firm. In essence a welfare 
function is discussed which is additively separable for each player’s objectives. 
Disaggregated models of intra-firm choice and rationality
To set the scene, three forms of behaviour for an organization R, are reviewed, 
differentiated by the form of their decision-making process and control over funding 
by two individuals or groups A and B. The first scenario introduces basic ideas of 
1
 See for example Leuthold (1968), Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), Lundberg (1988), Bourguinon and 
Chiappori (1992), Famulari (1995), Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Vermeulen (2002).
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revealed preference whilst the second indicates the problem of aggregation. Our third 
and final case examines two-player behaviour for the organisation and highlights the 
problem of organisational efficiency given individual/group objectives.
At the outset the objectives of the organisation suggested may appear vague, 
indeed this is one of our key assumptions, however, this methodology can be 
constructed for the pure profit maximization objective. The following examples can 
be taken to represent the problems met in upstream-downstream negotiations between 
two profit centres for example2. Our main point in the final example is that individual 
rationality on the part of the profit centres might overcome collective rationality in the 
sense that their behaviour might not maximize the profit for the organisation as a 
whole, though it might optimise their individual profits given the behaviour of their 
rival.
Common funding, common objectives
The central concept of revealed preference is fairly straightforward (see Varian (1999, 
2006)). Consider Figure 1, a firm, A, with only two inputs z1 and z2, makes a choice of 
input mix A1, from the set of input mixes, on or below the current expenditure 
constraint E1, like bundle A3. Now consider a change in input prices, z1 becomes more 
expensive and z2 cheaper. Faced by a new a new expenditure constraint E2 the firm 
chooses A2, which appears to be an entirely rational choice. However if A had chosen 
bundle A3 rather than A2 then it would not be a consistent choice as the firm had 
already revealed a preference for A1 over A3.
2
 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this example, though all errors and omissions remain my 
own responsibility.
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Individual funding, individual objectives
Let us expand the discussion to two managers i=A, B, now in different branches who 
are allowed by the organisation (R) to control their branch resources.
In Figure 1 E1 represents the initial expenditure possibilities for each of the 
two agents. Players A and B choose affordable input bundles at points A1 and B1
respectively. The sum of these two inputs is represented on the total expenditure 
constraint TE1 at point R1. Given the price change we saw in the previous case for 
player A, the new choices of input mix for A and B on the constraint E2, are A2 and B2
which total to R2 on the new total expenditure constraint, TE2, facing the organisation. 
Player A’s choices are consistent as before and likewise for player B. However, 
looking at the overall organisational choices, these look completely irrational as R1
was initially chosen in preference to R2 when both were available, but upon price 
change, R2 was chosen in preference to R1 again when both were available. Thus a 
Neoclassical single objective function analysis of R would suggest inconsistency with 
rational behaviour. Given the objectives of the individuals in the firms, they have 
made entirely consistent decisions based on their different preferences, clearly a wider 
set of possibilities should be allowed for the firm for aggregation of differing 
individual or group choices.
[Figure 1 about here]
Common funding, individual objectives.
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Our analysis now moves on to show that even with a common pool of expenditure the 
bargaining solution yields a richer variation of behaviour than that based on a 
Neoclassical common objective function. 
[Figure 2 about here]
Quadrant (I) of Figure 2 is a familiar derivation of the Cournot game solution 
(C). The figure plots the dictatorship or bliss points, (DA, DB) for players A and B
respectively where one player has controlling choice of resource allocation of three 
inputs rA, rB, rC. Note only two inputs need be plotted (rA, rB) as the third is 
determined by the level of finance and the expenditure on the other two inputs. The 
isoquants representing the decreasing levels of Y (these can be conceived as profit, or 
sales isoquants) created for each individual, fan outwards from these bliss points, for 
A, YA1, YA2, YAC, YA3, and for B, YB1, YB2, YBC, YB3. Reaction functions are drawn 
where the isoquant of one player is tangential to choices made for z by the other. The 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where the two reaction curves cross. The level of Y
for the Cournot outcome is inferior to the bargaining outcome, which might occur 
anywhere along the line ab, where player isoquants are tangential to each other, 
indicating that joint production of Y is maximized in the Pareto sense.
We can derive a similar diagram but measured in terms of the output vectors 
YA, YB  rather than inputs zA, zB  . The transformation is performed through curves in 
quadrants (II) and (III) for A and B respectively. In quadrant (II) the level of Y is 
determined from the contract curve and plotted against zA input. By definition the 
highest value of Y possible is YAD at point DA compared to the low value for player A
when point DB, player B’s bliss point, is reached from input pair zADB, zBDB. Player A
would have to input zAC of z along the contract curve, at point b, to generate the same 
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level of output YAC at the Cournot equilibrium (as the same isoquant YAD passes 
through both points). The same mapping of z against YAB is given in quadrant (III).
If we map the results from quadrants (II) and (III) to (IV) then another familiar 
diagram is produced. This shows the maximal output for both players as well as the 
Pareto inefficient Cournot-Nash equilibrium, C. Points ab represent the bargaining set 
in the sense that they signify gains to both players from cooperation and hence a 
motivation for optimal behaviour. The Pareto optimal solution to the bargaining 
outcome might come from the Nash’s (1950, 1953) axiomatic approach (see 
Chiappori (1988b)) with an objective function form of YN=(YA-YCA)(YB-YCB), the 
Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) geometrical solution or a version of the Rubinstein (1982) 
non-cooperative bargaining model.
The model lends itself to a useful interpretation of transaction costs. In general 
a collective rationality solution, that is, where the partners bargain, discuss and 
institute a form of sharing contract should emerge from this organisational game. If it 
does then the solution should emerge between a and b on the contract curve (quadrant 
(I))/Pareto frontier (quadrant (IV)) as these points represent Pareto improvements over 
the Cournot solution C. On the other hand they can just do their best given what the 
other player might do, a non-cooperative Nash solution and many possibilities exist 
for the type of Nash equilibrium achieved. This would provide an inefficient solution. 
The choice of cooperation versus non-cooperation is the realm of the prisoners’ 
dilemma solution where individual rationality dominates collective rationality. Non-
cooperative models differ from the bargaining framework in the sense that they are 
sub-optimal in terms of the distribution of resources between partners. Authors have 
increasingly been frustrated by the lack of explanation of why individuals may take up 
non-cooperation (strike behaviour for example, Manzini (1998))), indeed there seems 
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no reason why a non-cooperative solution should exist at all given that both players 
lose out. The prisoners’ dilemma provides a partial answer to this question, see 
Ostrom (2000) for a discussion of collective action, whereas the transactions cost 
literature probably gives us a better understanding of it (Seaton (2001)). Individuals 
cannot necessarily police each other due to high information asymmetry/costs and set 
appropriate contracts, that is, high transaction costs to bargaining may lead to a 
breakdown to non-cooperative behaviour.
[Table 1 about here]
It is worth reflecting on the implications of this model. As an example, two 
partners run an organization, R, and must determine the ideal level of each input. If 
they shared a common objective function, for example maximize output given a 
certain level of expenditure, it would not matter how they behaved, with full 
information and common aims they would still reach the same input and output 
decisions, the Neoclassical Pareto optimal firm, see first row of Table 1. The picture 
changes dramatically if the partners hold different preferences over firms’ input levels 
and goals, see Table 1 row two. If one partner decides all, we have a Neoclassical firm 
result, though depending on which partner holds the position input and output choices 
will be different.  If however democracy prevails and some form of bargaining 
arrangement occurs, then again we have a Pareto optimal sharing rule. Finally non-
cooperation of some type would yield Pareto inefficiency. Thus by allowing a simple 
difference of opinion in the firm many potential models of behaviour emerge. In the 
next section we show that revealed preference analysis allows us to test for this.
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III. Revealed Preference Tests of Intra-firm Rationality
Methodology
The following material is based on the revealed preference literature notably the work 
of Samuelson (1938a, 1938b), Houthakker (1950), Koo (1963, 1965, 1971), Dobell 
(1965), Afriat (1967, 1973), Uebe (1972), Diewert (1973), and Varian (1982, 1983, 
1984, 2006), Chiappori (1988a, 1988b) and Seaton (1997, 2001). 
The primary argument of this paper is that there is some disagreement between 
the players A and B on the actual form of the objective Y, this is very likely in the case 
for technological products where each player may hold specialist information, one 
may be the technical expert whilst the other may be the dynamic entrepreneurial 
driving force behind the product, in marketing for example. In this sense neither 
partner initially agrees on the optimal input mix. Thus two alternative forms for Y are 
suggested; the first known as the Neoclassical or uniform where Y is identical between 
individuals, YA = YB =YR, and represents a standard overall objective function for the 
organisation and the second form or individualistic where Y is different between 
individuals, YA  YB, and some form of bargaining outcome could be achieved. 
The individualistic form can be designed to capture altruistic effects, that 
player A takes into account the consumption of the other player, a special case is the
egoistic objective function is Yi(zi, zCi), i=A,B. Different model forms can be 
suggested depending on the assumptions regarding the level of altruism, egoism on 
the part of the players as well as the jointness in benefit of the inputs, see Table 2 
below. In Chiappori (1988a), the favoured forms were (III) versus (IV).  Here the 
third input zC can be separately consumed, whereas in (I) there is no individual 
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consumption. In the case of the household this may be a more relevant scenario, 
however for the firm either (I) versus (II) or (V) versus (VI) might be equally 
plausible. In (I) and (II) A and B consume equal quantities of the input, a public input, 
which seems sensible if satisfaction is based upon some output measure. The latter 
case, where there is joint use of inputs, might also be relevant, especially if we talk 
about two separate plants, which purchase inputs separately (data might be available 
here in certain well defined studies). However, the latter cases (V) versus (VI) may be 
far too general to provide sufficient restrictions on behaviour, so for this analysis we 
restrict our cases mainly to (I) versus (II) and use (III) versus (IV) for comparison to 
the initial work done by Chiappori (1988a) and Seaton (1997, 2001). 
[Table 2 – about here]
For completeness we will define and compare two forms of behaviour, Organisational 
Neoclassical Rationality (ONR) and Organisational Collective Rationality (OCR).
Organisational Neoclassical Rationality
Our representation of the Neoclassical model assumes that the aim of the 
Organisation, R, is to optimize Y which is determined purely by both players choice of 
business inputs zA, zB, zC = zCA  + zCB which are jointly bought and funded from 
retained earnings or loans F=FA+FB. We use model (III) from the Table 2. Let
Y = Y(Z), where Z = (zA, zB, zCA, zCB) = (z1, z2, z3, z4),  z3 = z4 = 0.5zC,  with price 
vector P = (wA, wB, 1,1) = (p1, p2, p3, p4). (1) 
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In the empirical manifestation of the model we define the main inputs as 
directors (zA) and employees (zB), where both enjoy some share of the input (zC) as 
before. Although hours of work is an obvious candidate, both inputs, zA, zB, could also 
represent the number of a particular employee type i.e. director, non-executive 
director, part-time or full time worker etc. This opens up a potential path of research 
into organizational governance issues (see Weir (1997), Leech and Manjon (2003)). It 
is envisaged that zC could represent some form of joint input for example capital, 
buildings, R&D or energy inputs. The organisation’s optimisation decision involves
maximization of,
YR(zA, zB, zCA, zCB) s.t. F - wAzA - wBzB - zC  0, (2) 
where the price of zC is taken as numeraire. Our only restriction on the form of YR is 
that it be concave, differentiable and increasing. Note we have kept the model simple 
for convenience and practicality as both quantities and prices are not so easily 
recovered from standard data. In this form standard consumer revealed preference 
tests can be used to determine the consistency of choices with ONR.
[Table 3 about here]
In what follows we introduce three axioms of revealed preference for our two 
models, for convenience these six results are also summarised in Table 3. Consider a 
set G(Z) of n input bundles Z1,Z2,Z3,...,Zn  where Zk=(zk1, zk2, zk3, zk4) from observed 
behaviour.  Koo (1971) and Varian (1982) define DR to mean directly revealed 
preferred where
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Z1(DR)Z2 if P1Z1  P1Z2. (3) 
As an aid to illustration and computation of preference behaviour it is useful to 
introduce two concepts, digraphs and Boolean matrices. As DR is a binary 
relationship, Koo (1971) showed that for a finite group G(Z) of observed input
bundles and prices a Boolean matrix could be constructed to yield a summary of the 
agents preference structure. From these define the ijth element of M, an n by n
Boolean matrix as
mij =1 if PiZi  PiZj, that is if Zi(DR)Zj. (4) 
 
The matrix M can be summarized by the use of directed graphs or digraphs. 
That is, for the square (n x n) Boolean matrix M, the digraph, D(M), consists of points 
or vertices  V1,V2,...,Vn and lines or edges ViVj which exist if mij = 1 but not if mij = 0
in M. 
Our question is whether this data appear to satisfy consistency of choice as a 
single organisation. Here we introduce a number of key axioms, from Varian (1982), 
the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) is defined in the following way, if 
Zi is directly preferred to Zj then bundle j cannot be preferred to bundle i, or
ONRWARP = { If Zi(DR)Zj then not Zj(DR)Zi for Zi  Zj} (5) 
This relation is also known as an acyclic strict order relation. It is worth looking at a 
violation of WARP in the following four input bundle example
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0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
M = V4
V3
V1
V20
(6) 
 
Note the cycle from V1 to V2 and back to V1, the digraph is not Acyclic and is a clear 
violation of WARP. 
The next example possesses a cycle, but is not a violation of WARP. Here we 
need a stronger argument to capture this apparent inconsistency in choice.
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
M = V4
V3
V1
V2
(7) 
For this reason a second axiom called the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference was 
suggested, and defined as,
ONRSARP = {If Zi(R)Zj and Zi Zj implies not Zj(R)Zi }. (8) 
Note that the revealed preferred relation (R) is the transitive closure of the relation 
(DR), and can be written as,
Zi(R)Zj: If Zi(DR)Zk, Zk(DR)Zl, Zl(DR)Zm, Zm (DR)Zj.  (9) 
 
In this sense the data above are inconsistent with SARP because it is not acyclic, the 
cycle exists from V1,V2 to V3 and back to V1.
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However, another case with for example Z1(DR)Z2 and Z3(DR)Z1 shows the usefulness 
of preference revelation. Consider the Boolean matrix and digraph below, where, 
again WARP is satisfied.
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0M =
V1 V2
V3 (10) 
But  through transitivity Z3(DR)Z1, Z1(DR)Z2 implies that Z3(R)Z2 represented in the 
new Boolean matrix M* with a star and in the digraph (11) as the dotted arrow and is 
consistent with SARP.
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1*
0M* =
V1 V2
V3 (11) 
 
This discussion can now be completed by looking at a final axiom, which is less 
restrictive than SARP but does take into account transitivity, the Generalized Axiom 
of Revealed Preference can be written as,
ONRGARP = {If Zi(R)Zj implies not Zj(SDR)Zi , for Zi  Zj}, (12)
where Strictly Directly Revealed Preferred (SDR), is represented by Zi(SDR)Zj: If PiZi
> PiZj, consequently if mij*=1 and PjZj > PjZi  then GARP is violated.
Organisational collective rationality (OCR)
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Following Varian (1984, p 590 Theorem 11), Chiappori(1988a) and Seaton(1997, 
2001)  and arguing that some form of bargaining compromise (sharing rule, see 
Chiappori (1988a)) is reached then partners optimise,
Y = a1 Y1(Z) + a2 Y2(Z), (13)
over quantities Z= (zA, zB, zCA, zCB)= (z1, z2, z3, z4), subject to prices P = (w1, w2, 1,1) 
= (p1, p2, p3, p4) where  a1 , a2  0 , a1 + a2 = 1, ai= ai(w1, w2, F1, F2, X1, X2), i=1,2
and (X1, X2) represents characteristics of the players.
OCRWARP, OCRGARP and OCRSARP can be written in a similar way to 
their ONR analogues excepting that they must take into account two restrictions, each 
based upon the personal prices for each group, as well as taking into account the 
jointness, if any, assumed in the inputs. It is worth noting that ONR is a special case 
of OCR when either a1 = a2 = 0.5 or one ai is zero. As pq represents the price of input 
zq where q=1,2,3,4, following Chiappori (1988) and Seaton (1997) if we observe a 
mix Zj, j=1,2,…, N  is chosen then ZjPj  ZPj and Zj is revealed preferred to all other 
affordable Z. The general firm level bargaining optimisation problem can be 
expressed as,
= a1jY1(Z) + a2jY2(Z) +j(ZjPj - ZPj),   j=1,2,…,N. (14) 
Differentiating with respect to individual i's desired input of q we get
 a1
jY1iq + a2jY2iq  = jpqj,   j=1,2,…,N (15) 
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dividing this expression through by j and noting that the new expression simply 
stated uses the additive separability of the individual utility functions to split the value 
of  price to individual level shadow/personal prices, the expression can be rewritten as
 jiq pqj +(1-  jiq)pqj = pqj,   j=1,2,…,N,  and    jiq  0 (16)
We require for each individual that each set of personal prices and quantities 
satisfy individual rationality. So for collective rationality to be true here, both 
individual rationalities must be satisfied given the nature of the choices made and 
values of the shadow prices (  jiq pqj , (1-  jiq)pqj ), though aggregate prices and input 
quantities may not agree with ONR.
Tests for the rationality of choices for one individual (ONR) given prices and 
bundles chosen are straightforward to do using revealed preference techniques. As we 
typically possess data regarding quantities of inputs, then the form of Z is typically 
known. Similarly we also normally possess information as to the value of input prices. 
However we do not know the individual valuation () put on these inputs by the 
bargainers, although we do know their bounds (p p  0). Further we cannot 
perceive the individual levels of inputs selected except of course for example the total 
number of employees or directors.
For the moment let us proceed as if we do know these values. For each observation 
j,k=1…N  we can construct two Boolean matrices representing the preference choices 
for i=A,B respectively depending on the personal prices they possess. That is
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Mjki=1 if ji(Zj-Zk) 0 otherwise Mjki=0
where jA =( jA1p1j,  jA2p2j,  jA3p3j,  jA4p4j) = ( jA1wAj,  jAwBj,  jA3,  jA4), 
jB =((1- jA1)p1j, (1- jA2)p2j, (1- jA3)p3j, (1- jA4)p4j)
= ((1- jA1)wAj, (1- jA2)wBj, (1- jA3), (1- jA4)). (17)
Noting that Z = (zA, zB, zCA, zCB) = (z1, z2, z3, z4) then as the data on individual 
quantities of zC may only exist in aggregated form we introduce another fifth 
parameter to indicate that the division is unknown, thus,
z jC=  jA5zCA, + (1- jA5) zCB. (18)
The final result of our comparison with personal prices is the two Boolean matrices 
MjkA and MjkB where j,k=1…N. The OCRWARP test to determine (for each parameter 
search) whether for all k and j that for individuals/groups A,B, is
If MjkA =1 implies not MkjA =1 and jk
and If MjkB =1 implies not MkjB =1 and jk (19)
in which case the data does not conflict with that particular realization of the 
bargaining model. A failure to find any parameter values that satisfy individual 
rationality for each matrix would imply some deviation from the bargaining model i.e. 
non-cooperative behaviour. Note this is a weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) 
realisation of the problem, SARP and GARP can also be introduced by derivation of 
the M* Boolean matrices (M*jkA and  M*jkB) as before for the Neoclassical case, see 
propositions in Table 3.
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IV. Empirical Methodology, Examples and Results
Empirical Methodology for OCR
Although the ONR implementation is straightforward, OCR is much more 
problematic as the parameters  jA1,  jA2,  jA3,  jA4,  jA5, j=1,2,…N are unknown, trial 
values must be inserted to minimize the number of CR inconsistencies. For a few 
observations (3 say) this is a trivial exercise, but for large N, 5N parameters must be 
searched and the problem becomes highly intractable. For example searching 5 
parameters over 7 trial values for N observations or 75N trials (for 10 observations 
7501.798x1042, thus if each trial takes one billionth of a second to calculate it would 
still take centuries to check through each trial). So some simplification was needed 
especially for samples sizes of N=50 or more.
A two stage method was adopted to take account of similarities and differences of 
parameters across observations, remember that the Neoclassical model assumes all 
parameters are fixed at 0.5 for all observations, so we are allowing a high degree of 
flexibility in the search.
Stage 1. Capture parameter homogeneity across observations.
A grid search fixing  jA1,  jA2,  jA3,  jA4,  jA5 for all j to A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and 
varying these between 0 and 1 inclusive. For example if we try out values 0, 0.5 and 
1, 
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[Table 4 about here]
there is a symmetry here, trial 1 is equivalent to trial 35 (we need only do half the 
trials). If +1 values chosen, 0, 1/, 2/,…, /, then ((+1)5–1)/2 combinations or 
if =7 then (16807-1)/2=8403 trials need to be made, however  for most data =2 
appeared adequate. We checked that no Boolean matrix collapsed to a null.
Stage 2. To capture observational heterogeneity.
A grid search for each observation at a time   jA1,  jA2,  jA3,  jA4,  jA5, j=1,2,…N  was 
carried out for the same +1 values. For N observations this means N(+1)5
combinations and a total of (N+1)(+1)5 combinations for both stages. Stage 2 was 
repeated  number of times. Thus (N+1)(+1)5  trials altogether.
Examples
In all four examples below firms were selected where they reported sales, 
depreciation, employment, number of directors, director remuneration, total 
remuneration and operating profit. The measure of total expenditure is total sales 
minus operating profit plus depreciation and the cost of each input is calculated in a 
simplified manner. The cost of a director is simply the average directors’ 
remuneration, whilst employees’ wages are calculated in a similar way.
Example One: Morgan Crucible Plc
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[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 presents data from Morgan Crucible Plc over the years 2000 to 2004. All 
variables have been deflated by an appropriate input price index. Let the group G(Z)
be restricted to 5 input bundles, G(Z) =[Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5] the matrix of expenditure 
differences (PiZi - PiZj) is calculated and presented in Table 6.
[Table 6 about here]
[Table 7 about here]
Noting the positive and negative values we can then construct the Boolean matrix in 
Table 7, which can be suitably represented by the digraph, Figure 3.  It is easy to 
verify that there are no cycles in this graph, nor any patterns that lend themselves to 
new preference revelation through transitivity.
[Figure 3 about here]
The Morgan Crucible data appear entirely consistent with all axioms,
ONRWARP, ONRGARP, ONRSARP and therefore OCRWARP, OCRGARP and 
OCRSARP. As this data is consistent with that of the Neoclassical organisation, how 
do we interpret these results? This means we cannot rule out that the objectives of the 
organization are so firmly held in stone and agreed by decision makers that bargaining 
is not a necessary complexity to modelling the outcome or that a dictatorship point 
like DA in Figure 2 exists. Nor can we rule out the possibility that the firm behaves as 
a bargaining institution.
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Example Two: Multinational corporations industry wide.
A heterogeneous sample of very large firms were derived in a sample of 92 quoted 
companies from the Datastream (Worldscope) database in different industries with 
sales in the US, Europe and the UK over a period of at least 14 years, sampled in the 
year 2003. There were no restrictions placed on industry, employees etc. Indeed 
heterogeneity was the desired goal. In this sense it is expected that a high degree of 
inconsistency should be found with ONR. The number of inconsistencies with 
ONRWARP and ONRSARP are 36 and 48 respectively, both less than 1% of possible 
inconsistencies, which does not seem particularly high. However, testing for OCR 
(see Table 8) also finds inconsistency with the Pure input form, both SARP and 
WARP. 
[Table 8 about here]
This indicates complicating factors emerge in this group of firms, which we discuss 
later. However the data are consistent with the Joint version of all OCR axioms and 
the Pure realisation of OCRGARP. This could point to the possibility that individuals 
are unable to have much impact on firm objectives in large organisations.
Example Three : The computer industry
In total the FAME database holds 2228 companies in the 4-digit SIC category 3002, 
the manufacture computers and other information processing equipment, this includes 
2058 identifiable public and private limited companies of which 22 are public limited.
After selecting on our desired variables a sample of 107 firms remained. We find as 
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before, see Table 8, that there is inconsistency with ONR. In fact 180 for ONRWARP 
(just 1%) and 1044 for ONRSARP (5%) which is a great deal higher than we expected 
from the previous example as these firms belong to the same industry with the same 
accounting years. Just as with Example Two we find inconsistency with Pure OCR 
but consistency with Joint OCR.
Example Four : The computer industry, sub-sampled by size
For a more in depth analysis of the data presented in example three the sample of 107 
companies is split into sub-samples of 30 then 50 firms by size of firm (sales). Thus 
the first sample of 30 firms would consist of the smallest 30 firms. The second sub-
sample would contain the same firms except the smallest would be replaced by the 
31st smallest. This sampling progresses until the final sub-sample which would 
contain the top 30 largest firms. 
Sub-samples of size 30 and 50 violate all ONR axioms as with examples two 
and three. Interestingly the number of inconsistencies displayed in Figures 4 and 6, by 
size of firm in each sub-sample, indicate a rise in inconsistency until a peak for 
medium sized firms, falling off for large firms. This is represented by a U-shaped 
trough for the ‘Goodness of fit’ measure used (see note to Table 8). 
 
[Figure 4 about here]
The tests of inconsistency with OCR (Pure version) were very surprising. 
Here, see Figures 5 and 7, small to medium firms appear to have behaved consistently 
with the OCR hypothesis of bargaining behaviour. However, the larger firms did not. 
On the plus side the data are consistent in all cases with the joint third input model
and the Pure OCRGARP axiom.
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[Figure 5 about here]
The results together appear to indicate that intra-firm resource allocation is 
determined by a successful bargaining form between the key decision makers in small 
to medium firms. Increasing further the size of firm tends to bring in complicating 
features that are not assumed in the bargaining model. There are many possible
factors. First, bargaining may be failing to some form of non-cooperation (increasing 
transactions costs i.e. policing and information failure) as discussed in previous 
sections. Second, a much wider set of individuals/groups might be involved in the 
bargaining situation (shareholders, directors, managers, other employees (trade 
unions, see Mumford (1996)).
[Figure 6 about here]
[Figure 7 about here]
V. Concluding Comments
The aims of this paper were twofold. First to show that the firm could be viewed as an 
organization where decision makers can hold differences of opinion and, secondly, to 
produce a workable test of organisational form. Given this interpretation of the firm,
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revealed preference methods for examining the implications of aggregated behaviour 
were presented. Four examples with three different sample types indicate the 
applicability of these methods and provide some explanation of apparent 
inconsistency with traditional Neoclassical techniques (ONR).
The key conclusion from the brief application of this methodology is that 
smaller firms (at least in the computing industry) appear to possess cooperative 
decision making behaviour though larger firms may not. The failure of some data to 
fulfil the restrictions imposed by the OCR model is in some sense absolute, though 
none failed OCRGARP in any examples. The cause of failure may be the existence of
more than two decision making groups, aggregation of inputs and also whether there 
are competitive labour markets, as well as the comparability of firms in each sample.
The main contribution of this work is that we now have a methodology that 
allows us to filter data for potential governance implications on input demand as 
Seaton (2001) shows for the household organisation. In this sense we can analyse 
whether hierarchy/governance may be failing to allow decision makers to realize their 
goals. Although this paper has been directed at determining inconsistency with the 
underlying model, further work should also be targeted at the implications for 
restrictions on input demand functions as this is a fairly straightforward application of 
Chiappori’s (1988a) contribution.
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Figure 1. The Aggregation Problem for A and B (Adapted from Green (1976), p. 144)
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Figure 2. Comparison of models
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Figure 3. Digraph of Morgan Crucible’s preferences
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Figure 4. ONR Goodness of fit for Example Four
___ ONRWARP, - - - ONRGARP, -o-o- ONRSARP 'Goodness of fit', 
sub-sample size 30, ordered by size of firm
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Figure 5. OCR Goodness of fit for Example Four, note GARP =1 throughout
OCRWARP the same as OCRSARP 'Goodness of fit' (Pure)
OCRGARP=1 for all cases, 
sub-sample size 30, ordered by size of firm
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Figure 6. ONR Goodness of fit for Example Four, Sub sample size=50
___ ONRWARP, - - - ONRGARP,-o-o- ONRSARP 'Goodness of fit' 
sub-sample size 50, ordered by size of firm
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Figure 7. OCR Goodness of fit for Example Four, note GARP =1 throughout, 
subsample size=50.
OCRWARP same as OCRSARP 'Goodness of fit' (Pure), 
sub-sample size 50, ordered by size of firm
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Table 1. Governance and difference of opinion
Objectives
(preferences)
Governance
and institutional 
relationships
Autocracy
Dictatorship
Democracy
Bargaining
Anarchic 
Non-cooperative
Homogeneous Neoclassical
Pareto Optimal
(One solution, YR)
Neoclassical
Pareto Optimal
(One solution, YR)
Neoclassical
Pareto Optimal
(One solution YR)
Heterogeneous Neoclassical
Pareto Optimal
(Two solutions 
DB, DA)
Pareto Optimal
(Complex, many 
solutions 
depending on 
bargaining power 
or Nash YN )
Pareto Inefficient
(Complex,
many solutions, like 
Cournot C)
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Table 2. Alternative objective functions for decision makers in the firm
Objectives Input type
Pure 
Inputs
One Joint 
Input
zC
All Joint
Inputs
zA, zB, zC
Uniform
(I)
YR(zA, zB, zC)
(III)
YR(zA, zB, zCA, zCB)
(V)
YR(zAA, zAB, zBA, zBB, zCA, zCB)
Individualistic
(II)
YA(zA, zB, zC)
YB(zA, zB, zC)
(IV)
YA(zA, zB, zCA, zCB)
YB(zA, zB, zCA, zCB)
(VI)
YA(zAA, zAB, zBA, zBB, zCA, zCB)
YB(zAA, zAB, zBA, zBB, zCA, zCB)
Individualistic
Egoistic
(II)
YA(zA, zB, zC)
YB(zA, zB, zC)
(IV)
YA(zA, zCA)
YB(zB, zCB)
(VI)
YA(zAA, zBA, zCA)
YB(zAB, zBB, zCB)
Asymmetric
Altruism(A)
Egoism (B)
(II)
YA(zA, zB, zC)
YB(zA, zB, zC)
(IV)
YA(zA, zB, zCA, zCB)
YB(zB, zCB)
(VI)
YA(zAA, zAB, zBA, zBB, zCA, zCB)
YB(zAB, zBB, zCB)
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Table 3. Definitions, Propositions, Axioms, References in text
Mnemonic Name Proposition/Axiom Reference
ONR Organisational 
Neoclassical 
Rationality
Identical personal prices (jA=jB =0.5Pj) 
for individuals/groups A and B
Section III
OCR Organisational 
Collective Rationality
Personal prices differ (jAjB) but 
jA+jB=Pj
Section III
ONRWARP ONR Weak Axiom of 
Revealed Preference
If Zi(DR)Zj then not Zj(DR)Zi for Zi  Zj Equation 5
ONRSARP ONR Strong Axiom of 
Revealed Preference
If Zi(R)Zj and Zi  Zj implies not Zj(R)Zi Equation 8
ONRGARP ONR General Axiom of 
Revealed  Preference
If Zi(R)Zj implies not Zj(SDR)Zi Equation 
12 
OCRWARP OCR Weak Axiom of 
Revealed Preference
a) If MjkA =1 implies not MkjA =1 and jk 
and 
b) If MjkB =1 implies not MkjB =1 and jk
Equation 
19
OCRSARP OCR Strong Axiom of 
Revealed Preference
a) If M*jkA =1 implies not M*kjA =1 and jk 
and 
b) If M*jkB =1 implies not M*kjB =1 and jk
Analogous 
to Equation
8
OCRGARP OCR General Axiom of 
Revealed Preference
a) If M*jkA =1 implies not if jA(ZjA-ZkA) >0 
=1 and jk and 
b) if M*jkB =1 implies not if jB(ZjB-ZkB) >0 
=1 and jk.
Analogous 
to Equation
9
Note: For n input bundles Z1,Z2,Z3,...,Zn with associated price vectors (P1,P2,P3,...,Pn) where Zk=(zk1, zk2, 
zk3, z
k
4 ,…) the preference relation DR (Directly Revealed Preferred) is represented by Z1(DR)Z2 if P1Z1
 P1Z2. The relation R is defined as the transitive closure of DR, for example Zi(R)Zj: If Zi(DR)Zk, 
Zk(DR)Zl, Zl(DR)Zm, Zm (DR)Zj.  SDR is the Strictly revealed preferred relation, see definition given for 
Equation 12. Define the ijth element of M, as an n by n Boolean matrix with mij =1 if PiZi  PiZj
(equivalently if Zi(DR)Zj) and zero otherwise. M* is identical to M except that the ijth elements are set 
to unity where Zi(R)Zj. For the ONR cases M is based on prices ( i.e. P) whereas for the OCR cases two 
M matrices must be derived, relating to each individual’s and personal prices .
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Table 4. Parameter trial values
Trial A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0.5 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0
4 0 0.5 0 0 0
5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
6 1 0.5 0 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
35-2 0 1 1 1 1 
35-1 0.5 1 1 1 1
35 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 5. Morgan Crucible Plc data
Year Z Directors
z1
Other 
employees
z2
Expenditure
zCA =z3+z4
Average 
wage dir
p1
Average 
wage 
employees
p2
Input 
price 
index
2004 Z1  8 12779 560184 335.51  24.74   0.9370
2003 Z2  7 14011 594347 621.42  25.22   0.9384
2002 Z3 10 14852 548202 134.34  23.38   0.9818
2001 Z4  9 16084 534555 132.46  23.51   1.0032
2000 Z5  9 16158 581201 146.22  24.44   0.9643
Note: The original accounts data has been processed, by deflating all nominal variables by an 
appropriate monthly input price index averaged over each financial year.
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Table 6. Calculation based on prices and quantities
piZi - piZj 1 2 3 4 5
1 0 -32156.26  -19992.14 -28242.93 -52481.75 
2   32307.69 0 11534.29   3132.07 -21124.42 
3   18381.33 -13037.75  0 -7513.61 -31702.11 
4   26118.21 -5385.39  7598.13 0 -24193.52 
5   51887.00  19818.44  32390.96  24227.86 0
Note: Calculation of expenditure differences.
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Table 7. Boolean Matrix
mij =1 if PiZi - PiZj 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 1 1 0
3 1 0 1 0 0
4 1 0 1 1 0
5 1 1 1 1 1
Note: mij =1 if PiZi - PiZj, that is if Zi(DR)Zj. If the ijth  element of Table 6 is positive record the value 
unity for mij otherwise zero.
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Table 8. Goodness of fit
Goodness of fit Example
Axiom
Morgan
Crucible
(N=5)
Multinationals
(N=92)
Computing
(N=107)
ONRWARP 1 0.9978 (36) 0.9921 (180)
ONRGARP 1 0.9977 (38) 0.9757 (550)
ONRSARP 1 0.9971 (48) 0.9540 (1044)
OCRWARP (Pure) 1 0.9998 (4) 0.9998 (4)
OCRGARP (Pure) 1 1 1
OCRSARP (Pure) 1 0.9998 (4) 0.9998 (4)
OCRWARP (Joint) 1 1 1
OCRGARP (Joint) 1 1 1
OCRSARP (Joint) 1 1 1
Note: These measures of goodness of fit should not be confused with those encountered in econometrics and 
statistics as they refer to some suggestions in the revealed preference literature. Essentially any inconsistency 
means failure, however authors such as Varian (2006) feel that useful information can be gleaned from 
investigation the inconsistencies further. For a short survey of goodness of fit measures see Varian (2006). We use 
the formula (TPI-TI)/TPI where TPI is the Total Possible Inconsistencies (2(N2-N)) from two unit matrices (both 
groups) and TI is the Total of Inconsistencies found, Famulari (1995), Varian (2006). Thus a value of unity implies 
no inconsistencies, below unity means the data is inconsistent but provides a feel for how bad it is.
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